3 edition of Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy found in the catalog.
Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy
Mihir A. Desai
|Statement||Mihir A. Desai, Li Jin.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- no. 13283., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13283.|
|Contributions||Jin, Li., National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||21,  p. :|
|Number of Pages||21|
Mihir A. Desai is the Mizuho Financial Group Professor of Finance at Harvard Business School and a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. He received his Ph.D. in political economy from Harvard University; his MBA as a Baker Scholar from Harvard Business School; and a bachelor's degree in history and economics from Brown University. In , he was a Fulbright Scholar to India. "Tax Clienteles and the Miller Model with Incomplete Markets," (with J. Jaffe), , Rodney L. White Working Paper , University of Pennsylvania. "Discovering Personal Probabilities When Utility Functions are Unknown," Management Science, , 33,
Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout. + yR) is the preference-weighted average tax rate. As before, institutional shareholdings consist of an optimal risk-sharing component, equal to yR/(yI + yR),and a clientele component that is induced by different marginal tax rates. When tax-rate differentials are zero, inves- tors' equilibrium holdings cannot be changed by paying dividends.
Guifeng Shi, Jianfei Sun and Rui Luo, Geographic dispersion and earnings management, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 34, 5, (), (). Crossref Lawrence E. Harris, Samuel M. Hartzmark and David H. Solomon, Juicing the dividend yield: Mutual funds and the demand for dividends, Journal of Financial Economics, , 3, ( Cited by: Tax sensitivity and payout policy: Tax reform analysis. To test how taxation affects dividend payout, we exploit differences in shareholder tax preference for dividend income. An owner in a high tax bracket (51% or higher) has an incentive to shift more of the payout to dividends that are taxed at % after the by:
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Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that Cited by: Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy M/B, or Market-to-Book, is a ratio of market capitalisation over the book value of equity, and is an indicator of potential growth, although it.
Get this from a library. Institutional tax clienteles and payout policy. [Mihir A Desai; Li Jin; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives.
Analysis of a panel of firms matched with. Downloadable (with restrictions). This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares.
Downloadable. This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with.
Dividend Clienteles Around the World: Evidence from Institutional Holdings ratio of earnings before interest and tax divided by the book value of total assets (ROA). payout policy tax. Grinstein and Michaely () study the interactions between investor adjustments and firm payout policy changes by considering both institutional ownership and payout policy adjustments in the U.S.
between and They find that despite institutional owners in the U.S. seem to prefer dividend-paying firms over non-dividend-paying firms Cited by: Several recent papers focus on tax-based institutional clientele effects. Perez-Gonzalez () looks at changes in firms' dividend policy as a result of tax reforms.
He finds that dividend policy is affected to a much greater degree by the tax reform when the largest shareholder is an individual than it is when. To summarize the general predictions of payout policy and tax clienteles, we initially display a classification scheme as presented in Allen and Michaely (): Shareholder group: Asset holdings: High tax bracket Low dividend payout assets Corporations High dividend payout assets Tax-free institutions Any assets We recast this scheme based.
We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms between and We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay any dividends.
But among dividend paying firms, they prefer firms that pay fewer by: We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in US public firms.
We find that firms attract institutions through their payout policy. On average, institutions increase their holdings in firms that repurchase more shares, and decrease their holdings in firms that pay more dividends.
(w/ L. Jin) Journal of Financial Economics, (April ), This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relationship between firm. Dividend Policy and Institutional Holdings: Evidence from Australia Thao Nguyen and Hui Li * dividend clienteles) or tax position (i.e., tax clientele) (Lee).
(Perez-Gonzalez) supported who own most of the stocks of the ﬁrm can decide the ﬁrm’s payout policy. For instance, if there isAuthor: Thao Nguyen, Hui Li. Allen, Franklin, Antonio E. Bernardo, and Ivo Welch. A theory of dividends based on tax clienteles. The Journal of Finance – [Google Scholar] Allen, Franklin, and Roni Michaely.
Payout policy. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Vol. 1A: Corporate Finance. “Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy,” with L. Jin, Journal of Financial Economics, April(1): “Dividend Taxes and International Portfolio Choice,” with D.
Dharmapala, Review of Economics and Statistics, February. Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy with Li Jin: w Published: Desai, Mihir, and Li Jin. "Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy." Journal of Financial Economicsno.
1 (April ): 68– May Taxes, Institutions and Foreign Diversification Opportunities with Dhammika Dharmapala: w (2) Prior studies investigate whether the yield spread for municipal bonds reflects the tax rate for an individual or corporate marginal investor (Poterba ; Fortune ; Mankiw and Poterba ) and whether there is an institutional tax clientele for dividend-paying stocks (Dhaliwal et al.
Mihir A. Desai & Li Jin, Institutional Tax Clienteles and Payout Policy, J. Fin. Econ. 68 (). This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives.
Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of. payout ratios within the context of the dividend models of Lintner (), Waud (), and Fama and Babiak () using a United Kingdom (UK) panel data set.
Using dummy variables for ownership data, they found positive association between a dividend payout policy and institutional by: 9. Brown JR, Liang N, Weisbenner S () Executive financial incentives and payout policy: firm responses to the dividend tax cut. J Finance 62(4)– CrossRef Google Scholar Chetty R, Saez E () Dividend taxes and corporate behavior: evidence from the dividend tax by: 3.
The empirical evidence supports the presence of strong dividend clienteles in a global setting. Net tax. Top marginal statutory personal income tax rate imposed on dividend income after taking account imputation systems, tax credits, and tax allowances in each country Institutional holdings and payout policy.
J Finance – Cited by: 9.By reviewing the interactions between dividend policy and other corporate governance mechanisms, this book provides a major contribution to the debate about the best corporate governance system.
A conscious effort is made to compare existing empirical studies on the UK and US with those on other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan. The book provides new empirical evidence on .Local Dividend Clienteles.
We exploit demographic variation to identify the effect of dividend demand on corporate payout policy. Retail investors tend to hold local stocks and older investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks. The effect of firm location on the relations of ROE, R&D, and firm SIZE with MARKET-TO-BOOK, Journal of.